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Employment Discrimination

by Peter Reed Corbin*
and John E. Duvall"
During the 2007 survey period, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit continued its recent trend of issuing many
opinions-most unpublished-regarding employment discrimination.1
The court rendered eight published decisions concerning Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VLI") 2 and fifteen published opinions
generally concerning employment discrimination. Unpublished opinions
in this area continued to flourish, however, with at least forty-nine
unpublished decisions regarding Title VII and fifty-seven unpublished
employment discrimination opinions overall. Clearly, the case that
received the most press coverage during the survey period was the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co.,' which clarified the statute of limitations in Title VII cases
involving pay discrimination claims on the basis of gender.4 The
Eleventh Circuit focused its attention on sexual harassment cases,

* Partner in the firm of Ford & Harrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. University of
Virginia (B.A., 1970); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude,
1975). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Florida.
** Partner in the firm of Ford & Harrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. Florida State
University (B.S., 1973); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 1985). Member, State Bar of Florida.
1. This Article covers significant cases in the area of employment discrimination law
decided by the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit during 2007. Cases arising under the following federal statutes are
included: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000 to 2000e-17 (2000)); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
("ADEA") (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000)); the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000
& Supp. V 2005)); the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (2000) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
3. 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
4. Id. at 2166.
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issuing two significant opinions, 5 which clarified the Faragher-Ellerth
affirmative defense' for employers.

I.
A.

TITLE VII OF THE

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

Theories of Liability and Burdens of Proof

1. Religious Discrimination. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit considered one religious discrimination case
during the survey period. In Morrissette-Brown v.Mobile Infirmary
Medical Center,' the court considered an employer's reasonable
accommodation obligation pursuant to Title VII's8 religious discrimination provisions. 9 The plaintiff, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist
Church, brought suit under Title VII, alleging that she was terminated
from her secretary position because her religious beliefs prevented her
from working Friday or Saturday shifts from 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.
Following a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of
the infirmary. On appeal, the plaintiff alleged that the district court
erred in finding that the infirmary had reasonably accommodated her
religious beliefs.1" However, the court of appeals noted that (1) the
employer seemed to utilize a neutral rotating system of assigning shifts,
and (2) the employer had approved all the plaintiff's requests for a shift
swap when she was assigned a shift that conflicted with her religious
beliefs. 1' The court also observed that the infirmary posted a master
schedule of all employees' shift schedules to make it easier for the shift
swaps to occur. 12 Finally, the court noted that the infirmary had
offered the plaintiff a transfer to another position that would not have
involved working any Friday or Saturday shifts, but the plaintiff turned
down the employer's offer.'3 Consequently, the court concluded that
this evidence more than adequately supported the district court's finding

5. See Nurse "BE" v. Columbia Palms W. Hosp. Ltd. P'ship, 490 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir.
2007); Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala, 480 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2007).
6. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
7. 506 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2007).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
9. Morrissette-Brown, 506 F.3d at 1319.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1323.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1324 n.6.

2008]

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

1139

that the plaintiff had been reasonably accommodated, and it affirmed
the district court's decision.14
2. Sexual Harassment. In two cases during the survey period, the
Eleventh Circuit clarified the employer's Faragher-Ellerthaffirmative
defense in sexual harassment cases, with both cases resulting in
significant victories for the employer.15 In the first case, Baldwin v.
Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama,1 6 the plaintiff worked as a
marketing representative for the Blue Cross office in Huntsville,
Alabama. In November 2000 a gentleman named Scott Head became the
plaintiff's boss when Head was promoted to district manager. In the
months that followed, Head, setting perhaps a new low for office
decorum, used profanity on a daily basis and regularly used the "f'word
in general office conversation. Head referred to most of the women in
the office as "babe" and frequently used the "b" word when referring to
women in general.1 7 Not limiting his profane comments to women,
however, Head also generally referred to the male marketing representatives in the office as "cocksuckers" and "peckerwoods." 5 There were
two incidents that occurred between Head and the plaintiff that could
be deemed sexual in nature. 9 On one occasion, Head called the
plaintiff into his office, closed the door, walked up behind her, and said,
"Hey, Babe, blow me." 20
On another occasion, after attending a
banquet with the plaintiff in Birmingham, Head invited the plaintiff to
21
stay in Birmingham with him for a "night of dancing and partying."
The plaintiff declined the offer.22

14. Id. at 1324.
15. See Nurse "BE" v. Columbia Palms W. Hosp. Ltd. P'ship, 490 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir.
2007); Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2007). To
successfully maintain a Faragher-Ellerth defense, an employer must establish two
elements. Baldwin, 480 F.3d at 1292. First, the employer must show that it "'exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior."' Id. at
1303 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998)). Second, the employer must establish that the
employee "'unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective
opportunities [it] provided."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting Faragher,524 U.S. at 807;
Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 765).
16. 480 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2007).
17. Id. at 1292-93.
18. Id. at 1293 (internal quotation marks omitted).
19. Id. at 1294.
20. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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The plaintiff did not file a complaint concerning any of Head's
behavior until November 2001, a full year after Head had become her
boss (and over three months after the banquet incident in Birmingham).23 Blue Cross immediately conducted an investigation of the
plaintiff's complaint, including interviews with both the plaintiff and
Head and interviews with any other potential witnesses in the office.
However, none of the plaintiff's allegations could be substantiated. None
of the witnesses corroborated the plaintiff's allegations, and several said
that the plaintiff also used profanity in the office. Blue Cross responded
to the complaint by issuing Head a warning. The company also offered
to hire an expert counselor for both the plaintiff and Head and to
monitor any future interactions. The plaintiff was also offered a transfer
to a marketing representative position in the Birmingham office. The
plaintiff refused both of these options and demanded that Head be fired.
The company declined to fire Head and offered the plaintiff the option
of counseling or a transfer on three different occasions. When the
plaintiff continued to refuse both options, Blue Cross requested the
plaintiff's resignation.24
The plaintiff then brought a Title VII claim against Blue Cross,
alleging that she had been subjected to a sexually hostile work
environment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Blue Cross.2 5 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether Blue
Cross had established its defense and determined that Blue Cross had
established both elements of the defense.26 As to the first element, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that this element focuses on the employer's
response to a harassment complaint.2 7
Regarding the employer's
response, the court stated that the employer's obligation was to conduct
"an investigation that is reasonable given the circumstances."28
Determining that the investigation in this case was reasonable (although
the plaintiff's allegations could not be corroborated), the court noted:
"Nothing in the Faragher-Ellerthdefense puts a thumb on either side
of the scale in a he-said, she-said situation."29
The court also held that Blue Cross had met the second element of the
defense because the plaintiff had "waited too long to complain.""° The

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.

at 1297.
at 1298-99.
at 1299-1300.
at 1303-07.
(citing Faragher,524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765).

at 1307.
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court noted that the plaintiff had waited over three months before
complaining about Head's sexual comment and proposition (the only
aspects of his offensive behavior that were sexual in nature).3'
Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that Blue Cross had met
both elements of the Faragher-Ellerth defense as a matter of law and
affirmed the district court. 2
The Eleventh Circuit reached a similar result in the second case,
33 The
Nurse "BE" v. Columbia Palms West Hospital Ltd. Partnership.
plaintiff worked as a nurse at the defendant-hospital. A pediatric
neurosurgeon at the hospital, Dr. Michael Chaparro, had privileges to
practice medicine at the hospital but was not employed by the hospital.
In late 2002 or early 2003, Dr. Chaparro began calling the plaintiff's cell
phone asking her to meet him for a late drink or to go out to dinner.
After three to five of these telephone calls, the plaintiff mentioned the
calls to her nurse supervisor and asked that her telephone number be
removed from the staff directory. However, she also specifically
requested that the incidents not be reported to the hospital administration for fear of retaliation. In May 2003 Dr. Chaparro allegedly began
making lewd and sexual comments to the plaintiff, but again, the
plaintiff did not report the comments. Finally, after an incident in
November 2003, in which Dr. Chaparro entered a closet behind the
plaintiff and began making sexual advances to her, the plaintiff filed a
complaint with the human resource director.34
The hospital immediately began an investigation. The plaintiff was
offered a leave of absence pending the investigation and was also offered
the use of the hospital's employee assistance program. In investigating
the complaint, the hospital interviewed both the plaintiff and Dr.
Chaparro. Dr. Chaparro acknowledged the incident in the supply room
but submitted that the incident occurred after a long history of mutual
flirting between himself and the plaintiff. Dr. Chaparro was not
disciplined by the hospital because he was not a hospital employee.
However, he was reprimanded by the private clinic that employed him.
It was also undisputed that there was no further contact between the
plaintiff and Dr. Chaparro after the plaintiff's complaint.3 5 The
plaintiff, not satisfied with the outcome of the investigation, resigned
approximately one month later. The plaintiff then brought suit
pursuant to Title VII against both Dr. Chaparro and the hospital,

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
490 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1304-05.
Id. at 1305-06.
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alleging that she was subjected to a sexually hostile work environment.
Following a jury trial, the jury entered a verdict in the plaintiff's favor
for $10,000.36
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit focused entirely on the second element
of the Faragher-Ellerthdefense: "whether [the plaintiff] unreasonably
failed to take advantage of [the hospital's] sexual harassment policy, and
if not, whether [the hospital] responded by taking reasonable and
prompt corrective action., 3 ' The key inquiry was whether the plaintiff's
report to her supervisor of Dr. Chaparro's calls to the plaintiff's cell
phone constituted notice to the hospital sufficient to trigger the
hospital's obligation to take prompt and reasonable corrective action.38
The Eleventh Circuit held that the calls to the plaintiff's cell phone did
not put the hospital on notice as a matter of law.3 9 As the court of
appeals concluded, "[alt best, the phone calls ...amounted to co-worker
congeniality," and "[a]t worst, they described a persistent but nonthreatening suitor, which still does not amount to harassment."4" The
court of appeals was also influenced by the plaintiff's request that her
report about the phone calls be kept confidential and not be reported.4
When the hospital was finally put on notice by the plaintiff's complaint
in November 2003, the hospital began its investigation within one day
of the complaint.42 The court of appeals determined that this was more
than sufficient to meet the hospital's obligation to take "prompt and
corrective action."4 3 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the
jury's verdict and directed that judgment be entered for the defendant.44
In Scarbrough v.Board of Trustees FloridaA&M University,45 the
Eleventh Circuit was confronted with a case of female on male sexual
harassment. The plaintiff was employed as an academic advisor for the
Florida A&M School of Nursing. Shortly after he was hired, the plaintiff
alleged that he was subjected to inappropriate sexual advances by his
supervisor, a female. After he rejected his supervisor's sexual advances,

36. Id. at 1307-08.
37. Id. at 1309. The court did not analyze the first element (whether the hospital took
reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment) because the plaintiff did not cross-appeal
the jury's finding that the hospital had satisfied this element. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1310.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1310-11.
42. Id. at 1311-12.
43. Id. at 1312.
44. Id.
45. 504 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2007).
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the plaintiff alleged that his supervisor then overloaded him with job
duties and verbally abused him in the workplace. Several months later,
the plaintiff interviewed for another position within the university.46
Several days later, the supervisor "confronted [the plaintiff] in his office,
verbally attacked him with abusive and profane language, spit on his
face, and knocked papers out of his hands."47 The plaintiff then filed
a formal complaint against his supervisor with the university's Equal
Opportunity Program's Office. After the tires on his car were slashed,
he also reported the matter to the campus police.4' A day later, the
dean of the university, who had recommended the plaintiff for the
coordinator position for which he had applied, promptly withdrew her
recommendation and fired the plaintiff "for 'unprofessionalism."' 9 The
plaintiff filed suit against the university pursuant to Title VII, alleging
that his termination was in retaliation for his sexual harassment
complaint. The district court entered summary judgment for the
university. ° On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit had little difficulty in
holding that a disputed issue of material fact existed about whether the
university's proffered reason for termination was a legitimate and
nondiscriminatory reason.5 Accordingly, the court of appeals vacated
the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings.52
3. Retaliation. Two reported decisions during the survey period
addressed Title VII retaliation claims. In Crawford v. City of Fairburn,5 3 the plaintiff was hired as a major in the police department for
the City of Fairburn, Georgia, with his responsibilities including
personnel matters and internal affairs investigations. Several months
after he was hired, the plaintiff conducted an investigation of a sexual
harassment complaint filed by a female officer in the police department.
At the conclusion of his investigation, the plaintiff submitted a report to
the police chief that found no sexual harassment violations. The
plaintiff's report, however, went further, detailing violations within the
department of insubordination, a failure to support the police department, and gossiping within the department. Approximately a month

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 1221.
Id.
Id. at 1222.
Id.
Id. at 1220.
Id. at 1222.
Id. at 1222-23.
482 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 495 (2007).
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later, the city had become dissatisfied with the plaintiff's performance. 54 At a city council meeting, the council, in agreement with the
mayor, terminated the plaintiff for "staff discontent, unfair scheduling
practices, poor management, and poor communication with the [c]ity."55
The plaintiff brought suit against the city alleging Title VII retaliation.
The district court entered summary judgment for the city.56 On appeal,
the plaintiff argued that a statement by the city administrator, to the
effect that the plaintiff's investigation of the sexual harassment
complaint "had opened up a 'can of worms' and was going to get the
[clity sued," presented a jury question about whether the city's articulated reason for termination was pretextual"
However, the Eleventh
Circuit disagreed because the city administrator's alleged statement did
not rebut any of the several nondiscriminatory reasons that the city had
articulated for the plaintiff's termination." Because the plaintiff had
failed to rebut "each" of the various reasons for termination articulated
by the city, the court of appeals concluded that the plaintiff had not
presented a jury question on the issue of pretext.59
The plaintiff in Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc."° did not fair any
better. The plaintiff worked as an assembler and floater for the
defendant, Cooper Lighting, Inc. A little over a year after she was hired,
the plaintiff filed a sexual harassment complaint against her supervisor,
complaining about sexual comments that the supervisor had made.
Approximately three months later, the plaintiff's employment was
terminated for excessive absenteeism. The plaintiff then brought suit
under Title VII, alleging that she was terminated in retaliation for
having complained of sexual harassment. The district court entered
summary judgment for the employer.6 1 On appeal, the primary issue
was whether the plaintiff had established the "causation" element of her
prima facia case-whether the plaintiff had established a "'causal relation"' between her complaint of harassment and her termination. The
Eleventh Circuit noted that the causation element can be established "by
showing close temporal proximity," but when there is no other evidence
of causation, the court concluded that the temporal proximity must be

54. Id. at 1307.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1308.
57. Id. at 1308-09.
58. Id. at 1309.
59. Id.
60. 506 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 2007).
61. Id. at 1363.
62. Id. at 1363-64 (quoting Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1021 (11th
Cir. 1994)).
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"'very close."'' 3 In this case, the court found that a disparity of three
to four months was "not enough" as a matter of law.' Accordingly, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court.6 5
B.

ProceduralMatters

1. Statute of Limitations. As noted above, the case receiving the
most press coverage during the survey period was Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Tre & Rubber Co.,66 in which the Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's decision 67 regarding the application of the statute of
limitations for filing a pre-suit charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). 68 The Court was
called upon to determine when the discriminatory act occurs that
triggers the statute of limitations for a claim of discrimination in pay on
the basis of gender. 69 The plaintiff had worked for Goodyear's tire
plant in Gadsden, Alabama, since 1979. In 1998 she filed a charge with
the EEOC, alleging discrimination in pay because of her gender. In the
plaintiff's subsequent Title VII action, following a jury trial, the jury
found for the plaintiff and awarded her back pay and damages. 70 The
Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that all the pay decisions made by
Goodyear occurring more than 180 days prior to the filing of the
plaintiff's charge were time-barred. 71 Because the Eleventh Circuit also
held that the only two pay decisions occurring within the 180 day period
were not discriminatory as a matter of law, the court directed that
judgment be entered for the defendant.72
Arguing before the Supreme Court, the plaintiff proffered that each
paycheck the plaintiff received during the 180 day period prior to her
charge constituted a separate act of discrimination.7 3 Relying heavily

63. Id. at 1364 (quoting Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)
(per curiam)).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
67. For a discussion of Ledbetter as it appeared before the Eleventh Circuit, see Peter
Reed Corbin & John E. Duvall, Employment Discrimination, 57 MERCER L. REV. 1039, 1049
(2006).
68. Id. at 2165.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2165-66.
71. Id. at 2166 (citing Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1182-83
(11th Cir. 2005)).
72. Id. (citing Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1189-90).
73. Id. at 2167.
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upon its prior decisions in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan14 and United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,7" the Supreme Court
rejected the plaintiff's argument.76 The Court concluded: "We therefore
reject the suggestion that an employment practice committed with no
improper purpose and no discriminatory intent is rendered unlawful
nonetheless because it gives some effect to an intentional discriminatory
act that occurred outside the charging period. [The plaintiff's] claim is,
for this reason, untimely."77
2. Mixed Motive Defense. In Chambless v. Louisiana-Pacific
Corp.,78 the Eleventh Circuit was confronted with the issue of whether
the defendant-employer had waived its "'mixed-motive' defense" by not
pleading it as an affirmative defense in its answer to the complaint (and
hence, whether the district court had erred in instructing the jury on the
defense).79 However, the Eleventh Circuit, in affirming the district
court's decision, came to the employer's rescue by holding that both the
plaintiff and the court were deemed to have sufficient notice of the
defense because the mixed-motive defense had been included as an issue
in the district court's pretrial order.80
C.

Remedies

1. Attorney Fees. In Jones v. United Space Alliance, L.L.C.,8 ' the
Eleventh Circuit was confronted with an issue regarding the interaction
between the federal offer-of-judgment rule, set forth in Rule 68 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,8 2 and Florida Statute section 768.79,3 the comparable Florida state law rule. 4 The defendant-employer

74. 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
75. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
76. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2166-72.
77.

Id. at 2172.

78. 481 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2007).
79. Id. at 1348.
80. Id. at 1349.

81. 494 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2007).
82. FED. R. CIV. P. 68 (1987) (amended 2007).
83. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.79 (West 2005).
84. Jones, 494 F.3d at 1309. Before its amendment in December 2007, Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 68 provided in part: "If the judgment finally obtained by the offerree is
not more favorable than the offer [of judgment], the offeree must pay the costs incurred
after the making of the offer." FED. R. Crv. P. 68 (1987) (amended 2007). By comparison,
Florida Statute Section 768.79 provides in part:
the defendant shall be entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees
incurred by her or him... from the date of filing of the offer if the judgment is
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had successfully defended against the plaintiff's claims before the district
court pursuant to both Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992
("FCRA"),"5 culminating with the district court's grant of the defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims. Because the plaintiff
had not accepted the defendant's offer of judgment in the amount of
$2,500, the'defendant moved for an award of attorney fees pursuant to
section 768.79. However, the district court denied the employer's
motion, finding that section 768.79 was preempted by the federal
attorney fee statute set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1988.6
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of
attorney fees but for a different reason. 7 The Eleventh Circuit did not
reach the merits of the preemption issue. 8 Rather, the court of appeals
held that under state law, Florida courts had adopted the Christiansburg
standard 9 for the defendants' awards of attorney fees.9" Under this
standard, defendants are entitled to fees only if the action is found to be
"'frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.''
Because Florida
law also mandated that Title VII and the FCRA be interpreted
consistently, the court of appeals concluded that attorney fees were not
available in this case pursuant to section 768.79.92

II.

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT-PRETEXT

For years, lawyers have encouraged employers to publish and widely
disseminate written policy statements of their commitment to nondiscrimination. The lawyers argued that the published policies were an
important defense tool in any subsequent litigation. In the unpublished
decision issued in Hoard v. CHU2A, Inc. Architecture Engineering
Planning,3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
addressed the significance of an employer's failure to have a published
antidiscrimination policy and concluded that the failure did not prove
that the employer's stated reason for its adverse employment action was

one of no liability or the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent
less than such offer, and the court shall set off such costs and attorney's fees
against the award.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.79 (emphasis added).
85. FLA STAT. ANN. §§ 760.01-760.11 (West 2005).
86. Jones, 494 F.3d at 1308-09; 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000).
87. Jones, 494 F.3d at 1311.
88. Id. at 1309.
89. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
90. Jones, 494 F.3d at 1310.
91. Id. at 1311 (quoting ChristiansburgGarment Co., 434 U.S. at 421).
92. Id.
93. 228 F. App'x 955 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
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pretextual.94 In Hoard the plaintiff-employee was a fifty-eight year old
man who filed a complaint against CHU2A, alleging age discrimination
as prohibited by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").95 After an adverse district court decision, Hoard argued on
appeal that the absence of a published policy by the employer constituted evidence of pretext.96 The district court entered summary judgment
in favor of CHU2A because Hoard failed to establish any evidence of
pretext to rebut the employer's stated legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the adverse employment action taken against him.9 7 The
court summarily rejected this argument and affirmed the district court's
decision.98

III.
A.

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

Substantial Limitation of a Major Life Activity

The long-established trend to narrowly construe the term "disability"
for purposes of determining coverage under the American with Disabilities Act ("ADA") continued during the survey period. 99 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued three decisions
during the period in which a narrow definition of the term "disability"
precluded the plaintiffs' claims.
In Littleton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,' the court determined that the
plaintiff's mental retardation did not constitute an ADA disability. 1 '
Wal-Mart denied Littleton employment after a bad job interview." 2
A suit ensued and the district court subsequently granted summary
judgment to Wal-Mart, finding that Littleton was not substantially
limited in any major life activity due to his mental retardation.0 3
Because Littleton had failed to adduce any evidence to indicate that he
was substantially limited, the court of appeals affirmed.' 4 The court
cited Williams which held: "'Merely having an impairment does not

94.

Id. at 958; 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000).

95. Hoard, 228 F. App'x at 960.
96. Id.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.

99. The United States Supreme Court held that the term "disability" is to be
"interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled." Toyota
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).

100. 231 F. App'x 874 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
101. Id. at 877-78.
102. Id. at 875.
103. Id. at 876-77.
104. Id.
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make one disabled for purposes of the ADA. Claimants also need to
demonstrate that the impairment limits a major life activity."'1 °5
In Greenburg v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.,'0° the court
held that the plaintiff's morbid obesity did not limit his ability to work
a broad class of jobs and therefore was not a disability for purposes of
the ADA. 1"7 The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the
employer.10
Finally, in Butler v. Greif Bros. Service, ° s the court held that an
individual was not substantially limited by his back problems."0 A
doctor diagnosed Butler with a bulging disc and degenerative disc
disease. He worked for a year and a half without incident following the
diagnosis.
Subsequently, Greif, Butler's employer, announced that
employees in his job classification would now be required occasionally to
perform additional job duties that involved bending and lifting. Butler
informed his employer that he was unable to perform these additional
job duties due to his back condition. When Butler produced a medical
certification stating that he could not bend, Greif became concerned that
Butler could no longer safely perform his regular job because of the no
bending restriction imposed by his medical provider. Greif required
Butler to obtain a no restrictions certification from his medical provider
before it would allow him to return to work. Butler was placed on an
unpaid leave of absence, and he subsequently commenced suit alleging
that he had been constructively discharged from employment. During
the jury trial, Greif moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close
of Butler's case. The district court granted the motion and an appeal
ensued.'1 '
Affirming the ruling of the district court, the court of appeals
determined that Butler had failed to establish that he was substantially
limited in his ability to work for a number of reasons." 2 The court
determined that it was significant that Butler continued to work in his
same job capacity for a year and a half following his initial diagnosis."' Additionally, the court determined it was significant that Butler

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 877 (quoting Williams, 534 U.S. at 195).
498 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
Id. at 1264.
Id. at 1265.
231 F. App'x 854 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
Id. at 858.
Id. at 855-56.
Id. at 857.
Id.
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had worked in a number of different occupations following his departure
from Greif."4 The court noted
Butler testified that he worked as a roofer, a mattress mover, a
handyman, and a truck driver after he was placed on leave by Greif.
Butler's ability to perform such jobs indicates that he was not substantially limited from a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs as compared
to the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities. " '
B.

ReasonableAccommodation

The attempted across-the-board application of a strict punctuality
policy failed to pass judicial muster in Holly v. Clairson Industries,
L.L. C."6 Clairson, the employer, implemented a new, no-fault punctuality policy in 2003.7 Holly, a paraplegic since 1984, lost his job
because of the new policy. 8 Clairson hired Holly in 1986 as a mold
polisher in its custom plastic injections molding plant. Due to his
disability, Holly frequently arrived late to work. 9 His tardiness did
not interfere with Clairson's production process, however, because mold
polishing was not as time sensitive as other aspects of that process. 2 °
In 2003 Clairson hired a new employee benefits specialist, who
eventually became the president of the company. That same year, at the
specialist's behest, Clairson implemented its new zero-tolerance
attendance policy.' 2' Under the new policy, each absence from work
counted as an "'occurrence,' while each partial absence-or tardy-count[ed] as a one-half occurrence." 22 The new policy stated that
an employee who clocked in one second past his shift start time received
a one-half occurrence.1 23 "The policy provide[d] for a progressive series
of verbal and written warnings as an employee accrue[d] more occurrences, and provide[d] for [the] immediate termination [from employment of
any employee] upon the accrual of eighteen tardies (or nine occurrences)
within one year." 124 The policy expressly stated that "'[a]ttendance is
an essential job function for all at the Company. Employees with

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id.
492 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1253.
Id. at 1249, 1254.
Id. at 1249.
Id. at 1252.
Id. at 1253.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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American Disability Act [sic] situations are not exempt from this
policy.' 125 Holly was eventually terminated from employment because
of his recurrent tardies.'26
In the litigation that ensued, the district court granted summary
judgment to Clairson based upon the policy.127 The district court
concluded "that strict punctuality, as defined by Clairson's policy, was
an essential function of Holly's position, and that no reasonable
accommodation would enable him to perform that function."128
Additionally, the district court held that Holly had failed to provide any
evidence that Clairson treated him any differently from nondisabled
employees; his claim failed for this reason as well. 129 On appeal, the
court of appeals reversed the district court on both grounds."' 0
First, the court of appeals concluded that, notwithstanding the plain
language of the policy, strict punctuality was not an essential function
of Holly's particular job. 3 '
The court observed that Holly's own
supervisors testified that punctuality was not an essential job function
for all job classifications in the plant. 3 2 The court explained, "[Wihen
considering the employer's judgment regarding what is an essential
function, we have previously considered not only the company's 'official
position,' but also testimony from the the plaintiff's supervisor."33
Two of Holly's supervisors had testified in the lower court that mold
polishing was not time sensitive and prompt attendance by mold
polishers, such as Holly, was not critical to the overall plastic injections
molding process.'34 The court concluded, "Thus, we think the record
fairly reflects a genuine issue of material fact on this factor alone." '
As for the second ground for reversal, the court concluded:
Clairson is not insulated from liability under the ADA by treating its
non-disabled employees exactly the same as its disabled employees. In
race and sex employment discrimination cases, discrimination is
usually proved by showing that employers treat similarly situated
employees differently because of their race or sex. However, the very
purpose of reasonable accommodation laws is to require employers to
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128.
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130.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(alteration in original) (brackets in original).
at 1254.
at 1255.

at 1264.
at 1260.
at 1257.
at 1258.
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treat disabled individuals differently in some circumstances-namely,
when different treatment would allow a disabled individual to perform
the essential functions of his position by accommodating his disability
without posing an undue hardship on the employer. Allowing
uniformly-applied, disability-neutral policies to trump the ADA
requirement of reasonable
accommodations would utterly eviscerate
136
that ADA requirement.
The court summarized,
"[Tihe fact that Holly's non-disabled co-workers were equally subjected
to Clairson's punctuality policy is not relevant to the question whether
Clairson discriminated against Holly by failing to reasonably accommodate his disability, and it was error for the district court to hold
otherwise."" 7
In Moore v. Accenture, LLP," s an employer's failure to engage in the
interactive process required under the ADA to formulate reasonable
accommodations was not actionable because the plaintiff failed to state
a claim for which relief could be granted." 9 Moore had worked for
Accenture from 1987 until 1992, when he became disabled. Thereafter,
he took a ten-year leave of absence from work during which time, in
accordance with the employer's policy in effect at the time, his employer
allowed him to keep his health, dental, and life insurance coverage in
place. 4 ° In 2002, however, Accenture attempted to implement a new
policy requiring disabled employees on long term leave (including the
plaintiff) to "return to work by 1 January 2005 or their employment, as
well as their insurance coverage, would be terminated."'
Upon learning of the new policy, Moore's attorney wrote to Accenture,
alleging that the policy violated the ADA and demanding that the
employer grant one of three proposed accommodations set forth within
the correspondence. The accommodations proposed by the attorney were
that the plaintiff (1) remain on leave of absence under the old policy, (2)
return to work with reasonable accommodation, or (3) receive a
severance package that would defray the costs of his ongoing health
care. The defendant did not offer the plaintiff a position that would
accommodate his disability and did not engage in the interactive process
of determining whether such a position was available.
Rather,
Accenture notified all its employees on long-term disability leaves of

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 1262-63.
Id. at 1263.
No. 06-15650, 2007 WL 3313152 (11th Cir. Nov. 9, 2007).
Id. at *4.
Id. at *1.
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absence, including the plaintiff, that they would not be terminated under
the new policy but would instead retain their leave of absence status
under the old policy.'42
Notwithstanding Accenture's change of heart, Moore subsequently
sued, claiming "that '[the defendant] essentially refused to enter into the
interactive process of determining whether an accommodated position
was available for [the plaintiff].

"1 4 3

Accenture moved to dismiss the

suit under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 4 5 Instead,
the district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 finding that Moore could not establish an injury in fact-and
therefore lacked standing to bring suit-because the defendant "'never
failed to provide the accommodation which [the plaintiff] had previously
received and which, when notified of its termination, [the plaintiff]
requested to be continued."'1 47
On appeal, Moore argued that this ruling by the district court was
erroneous. 4 ' The
court of appeals agreed but still affirmed the district
49
court's ruling.

We disagree with the district court's conclusion that [the plaintiff's]
claim does not present injury in fact for the purpose of constitutional
standing. As long as [the defendant] had a legal duty under the ADA
to engage in the interactive process of finding [the plaintiff] an
accommodated position, its failure to engage in that process would
create an injury in fact that is both concrete and specific.
By "conflating the standing inquiry with resolution of the merits," the

district court improperly relied on standing analysis to dismiss [the
plaintiff's] claim under Rule 12(b)(1), even though the dispositive issue
went to the merits. The issue was not whether [the plaintiff] was

injured by [the defendant's] refusal to engage in the interactive process
of determining a reasonable accommodation; instead, the issue was
whether [the defendant] had a legal duty to do so. Thus, rather than
dismissing [the plaintiff's] claim for lack of standing, the district court
should have examined whether, accepting [the plaintiff's] allegations as

142.
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144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id. at *2.
FED. R. CIV.
Moore, 2007
FED. R. CIV.
Moore, 2007
Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.

P. 12(b)(6) (2000) (amended 2007).
WL 3313152, at *2.
P. 12(b)(1) (2000) (amended 2007).
WL 3313152, at *2.
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true, his complaint stated a claim for relief under the ADA pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6)."'
The court added, "To establish an ADA violation, it is not enough to
show that [the defendant]-while granting a reasonable and full
accommodation-denied a different requested accommodation. We have
made clear 'that an employer is not required to accommodate an
employee in any manner in which that employee desires. '""'
Thus,
the court concluded,
Because [the defendant] afforded [the plaintiff] reasonable accommodation by allowing him to remain on leave of absence and thus to
retain his insurance benefits, we conclude that [the diefendant had no
duty under the ADA to provide [the plaintiff] with his choice of a
different accommodation. To the extent, then, that [the plaintiff]
alleges that [the defendant) violated the ADA by denying him a paid
position or by refusing to engage in the interactive process of finding
a reasonable accommodation for [the plaintiff] to return to work, [the
plaintiff's]
complaint fails to state a claim for which we may grant
15 2
relief.'
In Novella v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1" the court of appeals determined that the reasonable accommodation requirements of the ADA did
not extend to providing sign interpreters at termination meetings.'
Novella was deaf. Wal-Mart, his employer, decided to discharge him
from employment after it concluded that he had written obscene graffiti
on the bathroom walls. Novella requested that an interpreter be present
at this termination meeting, and his employer denied his request.
Litigation ensued, and the district court entered summary judgment for
Wal-Mart.' 5 ' On appeal, Novella argued "that the ability to communicate effectively at his termination meeting was both an 'essential
function' of his job and one of the 'privileges and benefits' of employment,
requiring a reasonable accommodation." 5 6 In reliance on an earlier
panel decision in LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 5 ' the court of

150. Id. at *2-*3 (citations omitted) (quoting Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys.
of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1280 (11th Cir. 2001)).
151. Id. at *3 (quoting Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d
1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 1997)).
152. Id. at *4.
153. 226 F. App'x 901 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
154. Id. at 903.
155. Id. at 902.
156. Id.
157. 146 F.3d 832 (1 th Cir. 1998). "An 'accommodation' is 'reasonable'-and, therefore
required under the ADA-only if it enables the employee to perform the essential functions
of the job." Id. at 835.
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appeals concluded "that communication at a termination meeting, the
purpose of which is to give the employee notice
of his termination, is not
158
an 'essential function' of an employee's job."

C. Personal Liability
In perhaps the most significant ADA decision rendered during the
survey period, Albra v. Advan, Inc.,' the court of appeals determined
that, unlike private suits brought under other provisions of the ADA,
individuals may not be held personally liable for violations of the
antidiscrimination provisions in the employment subchapter. 160
Distinguishing Shotz v. City of Plantation,' which dealt with the
ADA prohibitions against disability discrimination in the provision of
public services, the court determined that because the employment
subchapter was modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964162 as amended, personal liability 163did not accrue for alleged
violations of the employment subchapter.
IV.

REHABILITATION ACT OF

1973

A.

Substantially Limited
The plaintiff in Garrett v. University of Alabama at Birmingham
Board of Trustees" was unable to convince the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,165 treatment for breast cancer had rendered her an individual

with a disability.'6 6 Although acknowledging that the plaintiff had
suffered from severe periods of limitation during the course of her cancer
treatment, the court concluded that those periods of limitation were
"short-term, temporary, and contemporaneous with [the] treatment" and
not because of her condition.'6 7 The court explained, "A severe limitation that is short-term and temporary is not evidence of a disability."6 '

158. Novella, 226 F. App'x at 903.
159. 490 F.3d 826 (11th Cir. 2007).
160. Id. at 834.
161. 344 F.3d 1161, 1179-80 (11th Cir. 2003).
162. 42 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
163. Albra, 490 F.3d at 833.
164. 507 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2007).
165. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-7961 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
166. Garrett,507 F.3d at 1315.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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Reasonable Accommodation

In Nadler v. Harvey,'69 the appellate court determined that punctuality was an essential function of the plaintiff's job. 7 ° The court concluded on appeal that the plaintiff failed to establish that his insomnia
and depression had adversely affected his major life activity of sleeping. 7 '
Nadler unsuccessfully argued that although he slept an
average of five-and-a-half to six-and-a-half hours per night, his sleep
patterns justified his demand for a flexible work schedule. 172 The
district court granted summary judgment for the employer on Nadler's
claim, finding that he was not substantially limited by his sleep
pattern. 1 3 The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Nadler's
sleep pattern did not differ significantly from those experienced by the
general population.'
"Difficulty sleeping is extremely widespread," and a plaintiff must
present evidence, beyond vague assertions of "a rough night's sleep" or
a need for medication, "that his affliction is [I worse than [that]
suffered by [a] large portion of the nation's adult population. [S]omeone who.., sleeps moderately below average is not disabled under the
Act.,,175
Nadler is additionally noteworthy because the court took the occasion
to join with a majority of its sister circuits 7 1 in holding that the
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting equation 77 is not applicable to
reasonable accommodation cases under the ADA:
An employer must reasonably accommodate an otherwise qualified
employee with a known disability unless the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship in the operation of the business. Thus,
applying McDonnellDouglas to reasonable accommodation cases would

169. No. 06-12692, 2007 WL 2404705 (11th Cir. Aug. 24, 2007).
170. Id. at *7.
171. Id. at *6.
172. Id.
173. Id. at *1. •
174. Id. at *6, *9.
175. Id. at *6 (first, second, and fourth brackets in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
Rossbach v. City of Miami, 371 F.3d 1354, 1358 (11th Cir. 2004)).
176. Id. at *9 (citing Peebles v. Potter, 354 F.3d 761, 766 (8th Cir. 2004); Lenker v.
Methodist Hosp., 210 F.3d 792, 799 (7th Cir. 2000); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe,
Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 264 (1st Cir. 1999); Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (en banc); Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 348 n.1
(4th Cir. 1996), abrogatedby Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462 (1999)).
177. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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be superfluous, since there is no need to prove discriminatory motivation.' s

V.

EQUAL PAY ACT

In Hankinson v. Thomas County School System," 9 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's
grant of summary judgment to the Thomas County School System.'
Hankinson, a softball coach, claimed that she received less pay than
male baseball coaches, which is an Equal Pay Act (EPA)'.. claim, and
she argued that her claim had vitality because coaching softball was
substantially similar to coaching baseball. The district court rejected
this contention.8 2 The court of appeals determined on appeal that a
reasonable jury could infer that the two coaching positions were
83
substantially similar for purposes of the EPA."
Thus, the court
concluded that it was improper for the district court to have granted
summary judgment based upon the plaintiff's alleged failure to establish
a prima facie case. 8

4

VI.

SECTION 1981-PRETEXT

An employee failed to demonstrate that an employer's subjective
promotion decision was a pretext for discrimination under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, i s5 in Springer v. Convergys Customer Management Group
Inc. 186 The plaintiff, an African-American, contended that her former
employer discriminated against her based upon her race when it
promoted another employee, a Caucasian. The plaintiff claimed that she
was more qualified than the individual who was promoted. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on two of the
plaintiff's claims-unlawful
failure to promote and disparate pay under
7
42 U.S.C. § 1981.'8
On appeal, the court determined that summary judgment had been
properly granted below because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that

178. Nadler, 2007 WL 2404705, at *8 (citation omitted).
179. No. 07-11948, 2007 WL 4226389 (11th Cir. Dec. 3, 2007) (per curiam).
180. Id. at *4.
181. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000).
182. Hankenson, 2007 WL 4226389, at *1.
183. Id. at *2.
184. Id.
185. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
186. 509 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
187. Id. at 1346-47. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed two of her claims against her
employer, and a jury found her remaining claims to be "baseless." Id. at 1347.
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that employer's promotion decision was motivated by race. 188 Although
she argued that she was more qualified for the position than the
individual selected for promotion, the court of appeals concluded that the
plaintiff failed to demonstrate "that the disparities between the
successful applicant's and [her] own qualifications were 'of such weight
and significance that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial
judgment,
could have chosen the candidate selected over the plain89
tiff.,,1
The supervisory nature of the promotion at issue and the subjective
qualities that often mark a good supervisor played in the court's
decision.
"'Personal qualities ... factor heavily into employment
decisions concerning supervisory or professional positions. Traits such
as common sense, good judgment, originality, ambition, loyalty, and tact
often must be assessed primarily in a subjective fashion, yet they are
essential to an individual's success in a supervisory or professional
position.""9
The plaintiff failed to present any evidence that the
employer's reliance on these subjective considerations was "a mask for
racial discrimination. 'Absent evidence that subjective hiring criteria
were used as a mask for discrimination, the fact that an employer based
a hiring or promotion decision
on purely subjective criteria will rarely,
' 19 1
if ever, prove pretext. "
VII.

SECTION 1983-FIRST AMENDMENT-MATTERS OF PUBLIC
CONCERN

The free speech cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,192 and the First
Amendment193 continue to reflect the predicted contraction following
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos.' 94 Social workers who complained to their supervisors about
agency management and excessive workloads were communicating as
government employees, rather than as citizens, in Boyce v. Andrew. 9'
While acknowledging that the social workers' speech was "ostensibly
intermingled with issues of child safety and . . .mismanagement," the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined that

188. Id. at 1350.
189. Id. at 1349 (quoting Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 732 (11th Cir. 2004)).
190. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1186
(11th Cir. 2001)).
191. Id. (quoting Denney, 247 F.3d at 1185).
192. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
193. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
194. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
195. 510 F.3d 1333, 1337, 1347 (11th Cir. 2007).
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the speech "was not intended to address matters of public concern from
the perspective of a citizen."196 Instead, the court concluded that the
speech addressed personal grievances and job frustrations.19 7
198
To the same effect, in D'Angelo v. School Board of Polk County,
19
9
the court held that employee speech had occurred.
D'Angelo was a
high school principal who claimed that his school board terminated him
in retaliation for his efforts to convert his school to a charter school. °°
The district court determined that his efforts to convert his school to
charter status were "'part and parcel of his official duties.' ' 20

The

court affirmed the grant of judgment as a matter of law to the school
board.0 2
VIII.

CONCLUSION

During this survey period, the number of reported, published decisions
on employment discrimination issues continued to decline. The Authors
have noted this trend annually over the past several years and expect
that it will continue. Some interesting employment issues were
nevertheless decided during the survey period.
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Id. at 1344-45.
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497 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2007).
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